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Summary 
Exchange rates are important in the international economy, because they affect the price of every 
country’s imports and exports, as well as the value of every overseas investment. Following the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and ensuing economic recession, disagreements among 
countries over exchange rates have become more widespread. Some policy leaders and analysts 
contend that there is a “currency war” now underway among certain countries. 
At the heart of current disagreements is whether or not countries are using exchange rate policies 
to undermine free markets and intentionally push down the value of their currency in order to 
gain a trade advantage at the expense of other countries. A weak currency makes exports cheaper 
to foreigners, which can lead to higher exports and job creation in the export sector. However, if 
one country weakens its currency, there can be implications for other countries. In general, 
exporters and firms producing import-sensitive goods may find it harder to compete against 
countries with weak currencies. However, consumers and businesses that rely on inputs from 
abroad may benefit when other countries have weak currencies, because imports may become 
cheaper. 
The United States has found itself on both sides of the current debates over exchange rates. On 
one hand, some Members of Congress and U.S. policy experts argue that U.S. exports and U.S. 
jobs have been adversely affected by the exchange rate policies adopted by China, Japan, and a 
number of other countries. On the other hand, some emerging markets, including Brazil and 
Russia, have argued that expansionary monetary policies in the United States and other developed 
countries caused the currencies of developed countries to depreciate, hurting the competitiveness 
of emerging markets. More recently, however, emerging-market currencies have started to 
depreciate, and now there are concerns about emerging-market currencies becoming too weak 
relative to the currencies of some developed economies. 
Through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), countries have committed to avoid “currency 
manipulation.” There are also provisions in U.S. law to address “currency manipulation” by other 
countries. In the context of recent disagreements, neither the IMF nor the U.S. Treasury 
Department has determined any country to be manipulating its exchange rate. There are differing 
views on why. Some argue that countries have not engaged in policies that violate international 
commitments on exchange rates or triggered provisions in U.S. law relating to currency 
manipulation. Others argue that currency manipulation has occurred, but that estimating a 
currency’s “true” or “fundamental” value is complicated, and that the current international 
financial architecture is not effective at responding to exchange rate disputes. 
Policy Options for Congress 
Some Members of Congress may consider addressing exchange rate issues because they are 
concerned about the impact of other countries’ exchange rate policies on the competitiveness of 
U.S. products. Recently, concerns have been raised about the impact of Japan’s economic policies 
on the value of the yen, and the implications for the U.S. economy. However, there are a number 
of potential consequences from taking action on exchange rates that Congress might also want to 
consider. For example, U.S. imports from countries with weak currencies may be less expensive 
than they would be otherwise; countries may retaliate after being labeled a currency 
“manipulator”; and tensions over exchange rates could dissipate as the global economy 
strengthens. 
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If Members did decide to take action, they have a number of options for doing so. Options could 
include urging the Administration to address currency disputes at the IMF and in trade 
agreements, or passing legislation relating to countries determined to have undervalued exchange 
rates, among others. Two bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress related to exchange 
rate policies in other countries (H.R. 1276; S. 1114). Representative Levin has also released a 
proposal for addressing currency issues in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed free trade 
agreement that the United States is negotiating with Japan and 10 other Asia-Pacific countries. 
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Introduction 
Some policy makers and analysts allege that certain countries are using exchange rate policies to 
gain an “unfair” trade advantage. They maintain that some countries are purposefully using 
various policies to weaken the value of their currency to boost exports and create jobs, but that 
these policies come at the expense of other countries. Some political leaders and policy experts 
contend that there is a “currency war” in the global economy, as countries compete against each 
other to weaken the value of their currencies and boost exports.1  
The United States has found itself on both sides of the debate. On one hand, some Members of 
Congress and U.S. policy experts argue that U.S. producers and U.S. jobs have been adversely 
affected by the exchange rate policies adopted by China, Japan, and a number of other countries. 
On the other hand, some emerging markets, including Brazil and Russia, have argued that 
expansionary monetary policies in the United States and other major developed countries have 
reduced the value of the dollar and other currencies, and thereby have hurt the competitiveness of 
emerging markets. More recently, some in the United States have started discussing pulling back 
expansionary monetary policies, and emerging-market currencies have started to weaken. There 
are now concerns about emerging-market currencies becoming too weak relative to the currencies 
of some developed economies. 
During the 113th Congress, some Members of Congress have proposed taking action on exchange 
rate issues: 
• Legislation has been introduced aimed at countries determined to have 
fundamentally undervalued or misaligned exchange rates (the Currency Reform 
for Fair Trade Act, H.R. 1276; the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform 
Act of 2013, S. 1114). 
• Some Members have expressed concerns about Japan’s monetary policies and its 
effect on exchange rates, which impact the competitiveness of U.S. exports. 
These concerns have been raised particularly in the context of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) negotiations. TPP is a proposed regional trade agreement that 
the United States is negotiating with Japan and 10 other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.2 In June 2013, 230 Representatives sent a letter to President 
Obama urging the Administration to address unfair exchange rate policies in the 
TPP, particularly with regards to Japan.3 In September 2013, 60 Senators sent a 
letter to the Treasury Secretary, Jacob Lew, and the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Michael Froman, asking them to address currency “manipulation” in the TPP and 
                                                 
1 For example, see “Brazil Warns of World Currency War,” Reuters, September 28, 2010; Fred Bergsten, “Currency 
Wars, the Economy of the United States, and Reform of the International Monetary System,” Remarks at Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, May 16, 2013, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/bergsten201305.pdf. 
2 For more information on TPP, see CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for 
Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson.  
3 Representative Mike Michaud, “Majority of House Members Push Obama to Address Currency Manipulation in 
TPP,” Press Release, June 6, 2013, http://michaud.house.gov/press-release/majority-house-members-push-obama-
address-currency-manipulation-tpp.  
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all future free trade agreements.4 Representative Levin released a specific 
proposal to address unfair exchange rate practices in the TPP in July 2013.5 
• Some Members have also called on the Administration to address currency issues 
in negotiations with the European Union (EU) over a proposed free trade 
agreement (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership [TTIP]) and in 
renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).6 TPA is the authority Congress 
grants to the President to enter into certain reciprocal trade agreements and to 
have their implementing bills considered under expedited legislative procedures 
when certain conditions have been met.7 TPA expired in 2007 and some 
Members are looking to renew it to facilitate trade negotiations. 
This report provides information on current debates over exchange rates in the global economy. It 
offers an overview of how exchange rates work; analyzes specific disagreements and debates; and 
examines existing frameworks for potentially addressing currency disputes. It also lays out some 
policy options available to Congress, should Members want to take action on exchange rate 
issues. 
The Importance of Exchange Rates in the Global 
Economy 
What is an Exchange Rate? 
An exchange rate is the price of a country’s currency relative to other currencies. In other words, 
it is the rate at which one currency can be converted into another currency. For example, on 
August 30, 2013, one U.S. dollar could be exchanged for 0.76 euros (€), 98 Japanese yen (¥), or 
0.65 British pounds (£).8 Exchange rates are expressed in terms of dollars per foreign currency, or 
expressed in terms of foreign currency per dollar. The exchange rate between dollars and euros on 
August 30, 2013, can be quoted as 1.32 $/€ or, equivalently, 0.76 €/$. 
                                                 
4 Senator Debbie Stabenow, “Sixty Senators Urge Administration to Crack Down on Currency Manipulation in Trans-
Pacific Partnership Talks,” Press Release, September 24, 2013, 
http://www.stabenow.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1171. The U.S. auto industry in particular has been supportive 
of efforts to address currency manipulation in TPP. For example, see Michael Stumo, “American Auto Industry 
Applauds Senate Currency Letter,” Trade Reform, September 25, 2013. 
5 U.S. Representative Sander Levin, “U.S.-Japan Automotive Trade: Proposal to Level the Playing Field,” 
http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/levin20130723proposal.pdf. 
6 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, 113th Cong., 
1st sess., July 18, 2013; U.S. Congress, Senate Finance, Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Michael Froman 
to be U.S. Trade Representative, 113th Cong., 1st sess., June 6, 2013. For more on TTIP, see CRS Report R43158, 
Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): In Brief, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. 
Jones. For more information about TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of 
Congress in Trade Policy, by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper. 
7 For more on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade 
Policy, by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper. 
8 Exchange rate data in this report is from the Federal Reserve, unless otherwise noted. 
Current Debates over Exchange Rates: Overview and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
Consumers use exchange rates to calculate the cost of goods produced in other countries. For 
example, U.S. consumers use exchange rates to calculate how much a bottle of French or 
Australian wine costs in U.S. dollars. Likewise, French and Australian consumers use exchange 
rates to calculate how much a bottle of U.S. wine costs in euros or Australian dollars. 
How much a currency is worth in relation to another currency is determined by the supply and 
demand for currencies in the foreign exchange market (the market in which foreign currencies are 
traded). The foreign exchange market is substantial, and has expanded in recent years. Trading in 
foreign exchange markets averaged $5.3 trillion per day in April 2013, up from $3.3 trillion in 
April 2007.9  
The relative demand for currencies reflects the underlying demand for goods and assets 
denominated in that currency, and large international capital flows can have a strong influence on 
the demand for various currencies. The government, typically the central bank, can use policies to 
shape the supply of its currency in international capital markets. 
Different Measures of Exchange Rates
• Nominal vs. real exchange rate: The nominal exchange rate is the rate at which two currencies can be 
exchanged, or how much one currency is worth in terms of another currency. The real exchange rate measures 
the value of a country’s goods against those of another country at the prevailing nominal exchange rate. 
Essentially, the real exchange rate adjusts the nominal exchange rate for differences in prices (and rates of 
inflation) across countries. 
• Bilateral vs. effective exchange rate: The bilateral exchange rate is the value of one currency in terms of 
another currency. The effective exchange rate is the value of a currency against a weighted average of several 
currencies (a “basket” of foreign currencies). The basket can be weighted in different ways, such as by share of 
world trade or GDP. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), for example, publishes data on effective 
exchange rates.10 
Impact on International Trade and Investment 
International Trade 
Exchange rates affect the price of every export leaving a country and every import entering a 
country. As a result, changes in the exchange rate can impact trade flows. When the value of a 
country’s currency falls, or depreciates, relative to another currency, its exports become less 
expensive to foreigners and imports from overseas become more expensive to domestic 
consumers.11 These changes in relative prices can cause the level of exports to rise and the level 
of imports to fall.12 For example, if the dollar depreciates against the British pound, U.S. exports 
                                                 
9 Bank for International Settlements, “Foreign Exchange Turnover in April 2013: Preliminary Global Results,” 
Triennial Central Bank Survey, September 2013, https://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13fx.pdf. 
10 For example, see “BIS Effective Exchange Rate Indices,” http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer/. 
11 This assumes that changes in the exchange rate are reflected in retail and consumer prices. In practice, there may be 
factors that limit the “pass through” of changes in the exchange rates to changes in prices. For example, contracts may 
lock in prices of imports and exports for a set amount of time. 
12 It may take time for changes in the exchange rate to result in changes in the volume of tradable goods and services. 
For example, if imports become more expensive, it may take time for domestic consumers to find suitable domestic or 
foreign substitutes.  
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become cheaper to UK consumers, and imports from the UK become more expensive to U.S. 
consumers. As a result, U.S. exports to the UK may rise, and U.S. imports from the UK may fall.  
Likewise, when the value of a currency rises, or appreciates, the country’s exports become more 
expensive to foreigners and imports become less expensive to domestic consumers. This can 
cause exports to fall and imports to rise. For example, if the dollar appreciates against the 
Australian dollar, U.S. exports become more expensive to Australian consumers, and imports 
from Australia become less expensive to U.S. consumers. Changes in prices may cause U.S. 
exports to Australia to fall and U.S. imports from Australia to rise. 
International Investment 
Exchange rates impact international investment in two ways. First, exchange rates determine the 
value of existing overseas investments. When a currency depreciates, the value of investments 
denominated in that currency falls for overseas investors. Likewise, when a currency appreciates, 
the value of investments denominated in that currency rises for overseas investors. For example, 
if a U.S. investor holds a German government bond denominated in euros, and the euro 
depreciates, the value of the bond in U.S. dollars falls, making the investment worth less to the 
U.S. investor. In contrast, if the euro appreciates, the value of the German bond in U.S. dollars 
rises, and the investment is worth more to the U.S. investor. 
Second, exchange rates impact the flow of investment across borders. Changes in the value of a 
currency today can shape investors’ future expectations about the value of the currency, which 
can have substantial impacts on capital flows. If investors expect a currency to depreciate, 
overseas investors may be reluctant to invest in assets denominated in that currency and may 
want to sell assets denominated in the currency, in fear that their investments will become less 
valuable over time. Likewise, if a currency is expected to rise over time, assets denominated in 
that currency become more attractive to overseas investors. For example, a depreciating euro may 
deter U.S. investment in the Eurozone, while an appreciating euro may increase U.S. investment 
in the Eurozone.13  
Types of Exchange Rate Policies 
There are two major ways that the price of a country’s currency is determined, or types of 
“currency regimes.” First, some governments “float” their currencies. This means they allow the 
price of their currency to fluctuate depending on supply and demand for currencies in foreign 
exchange markets. Governments with floating exchange rates do not take policy actions to 
influence the value of their currencies. 
Second, some countries “fix” or “peg” their exchange rate. This means they fix the value of their 
currency to another currency (such as the U.S. dollar or euro), a group (or “basket”) of currencies, 
or a commodity, such as gold. The government (typically the central bank) then uses various 
policies to control the supply and demand for the currency in foreign exchange markets to 
                                                 
13 The Eurozone refers to the 17 European Union (EU) member states that use the euro as their currency: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Slovenia. The other 10 EU members have yet to adopt the euro or have chosen not to 
adopt the euro. 
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maintain the set price for the currency. Often, central banks maintain exchange rate pegs by 
buying and selling currency in foreign exchange markets, or “intervening” in foreign exchange 
markets.  
There are pros and cons to having a floating or fixed exchange rate. Fixed exchange rates provide 
more certainty in international transactions, but they can make it more difficult for the economy 
to adjust to economic shocks and can make the currency more susceptible to speculative attacks. 
Floating exchange rates introduce more unpredictability in international transactions and may 
deter international trade and investment, but make it easier for the economy to adjust to changes 
in economic conditions.  
In order to take advantage of the benefits of both fixed and floating exchange rates, many 
countries do not adopt a purely fixed or floating exchange rate, but choose a hybrid policy: they 
let the currency’s value fluctuate but take action to keep the exchange rate from deviating too far 
from a target value or zone. The degree to which they float or peg varies. The optimal choice for 
any given country will depend on its characteristics, including its size and interconnectedness to 
the country to which it would peg its currency. 
Between the end of World War II and the early 1970s, most countries, including the United States, 
had fixed exchange rates.14 In the early 1970s, when international capital flows increased, the 
United States abandoned its peg to gold and floated the dollar. Other countries’ currencies were 
pegged to the dollar, and after the dollar floated, some other countries decided to float their 
currencies as well.  
In 2012, 35% of countries had floating currencies.15 This includes several major currencies, such 
as the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the British pound, whose economies together 
account for 50% of global GDP.16 Many countries use policies to manage the value of their 
currencies, although some manage it more than others. This includes many small countries, such 
as Panama and Hong Kong, as well as a few larger economies, such as China, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia. In 2012, 40% of countries used a “soft” peg, which let the exchange rate fluctuate within 
a desired range, and 13% of countries used a “hard” peg, which anchors the currency’s value 
more strictly, including the formal adoption of a foreign currency to use as a domestic currency 
(for example, Ecuador has adopted the U.S. dollar as its national currency).17 No large country 
uses a hard peg. Figure 1 depicts the exchange rate policies adopted by different countries. 
                                                 
14 Exchange rates were, in theory, fixed but “adjustable,” meaning that countries could adjust their exchange rates to 
correct a “fundamental disequilibrium” in their exchange rate. In practice, it was rare for a country to adjust its 
exchange rate outside of a narrow band. 
15 IMF, “Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions,” 2012, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2012/eaer/ar2012.pdf. Exchange rate data on how the exchange rate policies work 
in practice (the “de facto” exchange rate policy), which may or may not match the official description of the policy (the 
“de jure” exchange rate policy). Countries that are members of a currency union (where multiple countries may adopt 
use of the same currency, including the Eurozone, the East Caribbean Currency Union, the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union, and the Central African Economic Community) are coded according to how the currency is managed. 
For example, the euro is a floating currency, and individual members of the Eurozone for this purpose are counted as 
having adopted floating exchange rates. 
16 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013. 
17 13% use other managed arrangements that do not fall neatly into a “soft” peg or “hard” peg category, sometimes 
because the government changes exchange rate policies frequently. 
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Figure 1. Map of Exchange Rate Policies by Country 
 
Source: IMF, “Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions,” 2012. 
Notes: See footnote 15. 
Exchange Rate Misalignments 
Many economists believe that exchange rate levels can differ from the underlying “fundamental” 
or “equilibrium” value of the exchange rate. When an actual exchange rate differs from its 
fundamental or equilibrium value, the currency is said to be misaligned. More specifically, when 
the actual exchange rate is too high, the currency is said to be overvalued; when the actual rate is 
too low, the currency is said to be undervalued.  
Considerable debate exists about what the fundamental or equilibrium value of a currency is and 
how to define or calculate currency misalignment.18 For example, some economists believe that a 
currency is misaligned when the exchange rate set by the government, or the official rate, differs 
from what would be set by the market if the currency were allowed to float. By this reasoning, 
governments that take policy actions to sustain an exchange rate peg, such as intervening in 
currency markets, most likely have misaligned currencies. Additionally, this view suggests that 
floating currencies, by definition, cannot be misaligned, since their values are determined by 
market forces.  
                                                 
18 For example, see Enzo Cassino and David Oxley, “Exchange Rate Valuation and its Impact on the Real Economy,” 
New Zealand Treasury, March 2013, 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research_and_publications/seminars_and_workshops/mar2013/5200821.pdf; Rebecca L. 
Driver and Peter F. Westaway, “ Concepts of Equilibrium Exchange Rates,” Bank of England, Working Paper No. 248, 
2004, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/workingpapers/wp248.pdf. 
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For other economists, a currency can be misaligned even if it is a floating rate. This is the case if 
the exchange rate differs from its long-term equilibrium value, which is based on economic 
fundamentals and eliminates short-term factors that can cause the exchange rate to fluctuate. 
Defining or estimating an equilibrium exchange rate is not a straightforward process and is 
complex. Economists disagree on the factors that determine an equilibrium exchange rate, and 
whether the concept is a valid one, particularly when applied to countries with floating exchange 
rates. Economists have developed a number of models for calculating differences between actual 
exchange rates and equilibrium exchange rates. Estimates of whether a currency is misaligned, 
and if so, by how much, can vary widely depending on the model used.19 
General Debates over “Currency Wars” 
Amid heightened concerns about slow growth and high unemployment in many countries, 
disagreements over exchange rate policies have broadened after the global financial crisis. In 
2010, Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, declared that a “currency war” had broken out in 
the global economy.20 
At the heart of current disagreements is whether or not countries are using policies to 
intentionally push down the value of their currency in order to gain a trade advantage at the 
expense of other countries. A weak currency makes exports cheaper to foreigners and imports 
more expensive to domestic consumers. This can lead to higher production of exports and import-
competing goods, which could help spur export-led growth and job creation in the export sector.  
However, if one country weakens its currency, there can be negative implications for certain 
sectors in other countries. In general, a weaker currency in one country can hurt exporters in other 
countries, since their exports become relatively more expensive and may fall as a result. 
Additionally, domestic firms producing import-competing goods may find it harder to compete 
with imports from countries with weak currencies, since weak currencies lower the cost of 
imports. Under certain circumstances, policies used to drive down the value of a currency in one 
country can cause other countries to run persistent trade deficits (imports exceed exports) that can 
be difficult to adjust and can be associated with the build-up of debt.  
For these reasons, some economists view efforts to boost exports through a weaker exchange rate 
as “unfair” to other countries and a type of “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy—the benefit the country 
gets from the policy comes at the expense of other countries. These views are particularly rooted 
in the experience in the 1930s, during which, some economists argue, countries devalued their 
currencies to boost exports, in response to widespread high unemployment and negative 
economic conditions.21 The devaluations in the 1930s are referred to as “competitive 
                                                 
19 For example, see “Misleading Misalignments,” Economist, June 21, 2007; Peter Isard, “Equilibrium Exchange Rates: 
Assessment Methodologies,” IMF Working Paper WP/07/296, December 2007, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07296.pdf; Treasury Department, “Semiannual Report on International 
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” December 2006, Appendix 2, Exchange Rate Misalignment: What the Models 
Tell Us and Methodological Considerations,” http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/2006_Appendix-2.pdf. 
20 For example, see “Brazil Warns of World Currency War,” Reuters, September 28, 2010. 
21 For example, see Beth A. Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the 
Interwar Years. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Not all economists characterize changes in exchange 
rates during the 1930s as competitive devaluations. For example, some argue that countries were forced to devalue 
(continued...) 
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devaluations,” since a devaluation in one country was often offset by a devaluation in another 
country, making it difficult for any country to gain a lasting advantage.22 Some economists view 
the competitive devaluations of the 1930s as detrimental to international trade, and, in addition to 
protectionist trade policies, as exacerbating the Great Depression.  
Many economists disagree that “currency wars” and competitive devaluations are currently 
underway in the global economy and argue that, if they are, they are not necessarily bad for the 
global economy. Because currency devaluations can often involve printing domestic currency, or 
implementing expansionary monetary policies, they can stimulate short-term economic growth.23 
If enough countries engage in currency interventions, then there may be no net change in relative 
exchange rate levels and the simultaneous currency interventions may help reflate the global 
economy and boost global economic growth. Economists of this viewpoint argue that competitive 
devaluations of the 1930s did not cause the Great Depression and, in fact, actually helped end it.24  
Additionally, a weak currency in one country does not have an unambiguous negative effect on 
other countries. Instead, consumers and certain sectors may benefit when other countries have 
weak currencies. In particular, consumers that purchase imports from abroad benefit when other 
countries have weak currencies, because imports become cheaper. Additionally, businesses that 
rely on inputs from overseas also benefit when other countries have weak currencies, by lowering 
the costs of inputs and thus the overall cost of production. 
Specific Debates over Exchange Rates 
In current debates about exchange rates and whether countries are engaged in unfair currency 
policies to weaken their currencies, two major types of concerns have been raised: first, concerns 
about countries engaged in interventions in foreign currency markets, and second, concerns about 
the effects of expansionary monetary policies in some developed countries on exchange rate 
levels.  
Currency Interventions 
Governments have various mechanisms they can use to weaken, or devalue, their currency, or 
sustain a lower exchange rate than would exist in the absence of government intervention. One 
way is intervening in foreign exchange markets or, more specifically, selling domestic currency in 
exchange for foreign currency. These interventions increase the supply of domestic currency 
relative to other currencies in foreign exchange markets, pushing the price of the currency down. 
The foreign currency is typically then invested in foreign assets, most commonly government 
bonds. 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
because they were running out of gold reserves. See Douglas A. Irwin, Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930s 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012). 
22 Depreciation is typically used to refer to a currency weakening due to market forces. When a government undertakes 
specific policies to weaken the value of its currency, it is typically referred to as a devaluation. 
23 For example, see Matthew O’Brien, “Currency Wars, What Are They Good For? Absolutely Ending Depressions,” 
The Atlantic, February 5, 2013. 
24 Barry Eichengreen, “Currency War or International Policy Coordination?,” University of California, Berkeley, 
January 2013, http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/curr_war_JPM_2013.pdf. 
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Concerns about currency interventions are not new. For nearly a decade, various policy makers 
and analysts have raised concerns about China’s interventions in foreign exchange markets to 
maintain, in their view, an undervalued currency relative to the U.S. dollar. Since the global 
financial crisis, however, concerns about currency interventions have become more widespread, 
as more countries, including Switzerland and others, have intervened in foreign exchange 
markets, in the view of some analysts, to lower the value of their currency.25  
China26 
Over the past decade, the Chinese government has tightly managed the value of its currency, the 
renminbi (RMB) or yuan, against the U.S. dollar.27 Some policy makers and analysts believe that 
China’s currency policies keep the RMB undervalued relative to the U.S. dollar. They argue that 
China’s policies give Chinese exports an “unfair” trade advantage against U.S. exports and are a 
major contributing factor to the U.S. trade deficit with China.  
In 1994, China began to peg its currency to the U.S. dollar and kept it pegged to the U.S. dollar at 
a constant rate through 2005. In July 2005, it moved to a managed peg system, in which the 
government allowed the currency to fluctuate within a range, and the currency began to 
appreciate. In 2008, China halted appreciation of the RMB, due to concerns about the effects of 
the global financial crisis on Chinese exports. In 2012, China again allowed more flexibility in 
the value of the RMB against the U.S. dollar. Between 2005 and the end of 2012, the RMB 
appreciated by almost 25% against the dollar (Figure 2).28 
The Chinese government has used various policies, including intervening in foreign currency 
markets and capital controls, to manage this appreciation of the RMB against the U.S. dollar. It 
does so primarily by printing yuan and selling it for U.S. currency and assets denominated in U.S. 
dollars, usually U.S. government bonds. It also manages the value of its exchange rate through 
capital controls that limit buying and selling of RMB.29 As China has engaged in currency 
interventions, its holdings of foreign exchange reserves have increased, from $715 billion in the 
first quarter of 2005 to $3,463 billion in the first quarter of 2013 (Figure 2), equivalent to about 
38% of China’s GDP.30 Some economists view the sustained, substantial increase in foreign 
exchange reserves as evidence that the Chinese government keeps the value of the RMB below 
what it would be if the RMB were allowed to float freely. 
More recently, some economists are starting to question whether the yuan is still undervalued 
against the U.S. dollar when adjusting for differences in price levels (the real exchange rate), and 
                                                 
25 For example, see Alan Beattie, “Hostilities Escalate to Hidden Currency War,” Financial Times, September 27, 
2010. 
26 For more on China’s currency, see CRS Report RL32165, China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. 
Trade Policy, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte. 
27 The official name of China’s currency is the renminbi (RMB), which is denominated in yuan units. Both RMB and 
yuan are used interchangeably to refer to China’s currency. 
28 Change in the nominal exchange rate (not adjusted for differences in inflation between China and the United States).  
29 The RMB is largely convertible on a current account (trade) basis, but not on a capital account basis, meaning that 
foreign exchange in China is not regularly obtainable for investment purposes. In other words, it can be difficult to 
purchase investments denominated in RMB. 
30 IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2013; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
Current Debates over Exchange Rates: Overview and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 10 
if so, by how much, particularly as inflation has increased in China.31 They point to the fact that 
foreign exchange reserves have not grown as quickly since 2011 as some evidence of this 
adjustment. In July 2012, the IMF changed its assessment of the RMB’s value from significantly 
undervalued to moderately undervalued.32 
Figure 2. China’s Exchange Rate and Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
Source: Federal Reserve; IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Note: For the graph on the left, an increase represents an appreciation of the RMB relative to the U.S. dollar. 
Switzerland 
Before the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, Switzerland had a floating exchange rate. During 
the crisis, the Swiss franc was viewed as a “safe haven” currency, or a currency that investors 
trusted more than others and would therefore buy in times of uncertainty.33 Increased investor 
demand for the Swiss franc put upward pressure on the currency, which, in turn, raised concerns 
for the Swiss government about the competitiveness of Swiss exports. In 2009 and 2010, the 
Swiss central bank (the National Bank of Switzerland) intervened in foreign exchange markets to 
prevent or limit appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro, by selling Swiss francs for 
foreign currencies.34 When a worsening of the Eurozone crisis put additional upward pressure on 
the Swiss franc, the Swiss central bank announced in September 2011 that it would buy 
“unlimited quantities” of foreign currency to keep the Swiss franc from appreciating above a 
specific value (Figure 3).35 As a result of its currency interventions, Switzerland’s foreign 
exchange reserves increased more than tenfold, from $46 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008 to 
                                                 
31 “The Cheapest Thing Going is Gone,” Economist, June 15, 2013. 
32 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with People’s Republic of China,” Public 
Information Notice No. 12/86, July 24, 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2012/pn1286.htm; Simon 
Rabinovitch, “IMF Says Renminbi ‘Moderately Undervalued’,” Financial Times, July 25, 2012. 
33 Michael Bordo, Owen F. Humpage, Anna J. Schwartz, “Foreign-Exchange Intervention and the Fundamental 
Trilemma of International Finance: Notes for Currency Wars,” VoxEU, June 18, 2012, 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/notes-currency-wars-trilemma-international-finance. 
34 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, “Report to Congress on International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies,” July 8, 2010, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20July%202010.pdf. 
35 Swiss National Bank Press Release, September 6, 2011, 
http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20110906/source/pre_20110906.en.pdf. 
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$470 billion in the first quarter of 2013 (Figure 3), about 73% of Swiss GDP.36 Before the 
financial crisis, the Swiss central bank had last intervened in the foreign exchange market in 
1995.37  
Many economists argue that the recent interventions by the Swiss central bank have held the 
value of the Swiss franc lower than it would be otherwise (if the currency floated freely and the 
Swiss central bank did not intervene in foreign exchange markets). They argue that this has given 
Swiss exports an advantage, helping Switzerland maintain a trade surplus and one of the lowest 
unemployment rates in Europe.38 However, some economists have noted that Switzerland’s 
trading partners have generally not “kicked up much fuss” over its interventions, and that 
Switzerland’s interventions are the “overlooked” currency war in Europe.39 This could be due to 
the small size of the Swiss economy, and a perception held by some that Swiss interventions are a 
defensive measure against developments in the rest of Europe that are beyond its control.  
Figure 3. Switzerland’s Exchange Rate and Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
Source: European Central Bank; IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Note: For the graph on the left, an increase represents an appreciation of the Swiss franc relative to the euro. 
Other Countries 
Other examples of interventions to weaken currencies since the global financial crisis include, 
among others:  
• Japan, which sold yen in foreign exchange markets in 2010 and 2011. Japan’s 
interventions in March 2011 were unusual in that they were supported with 
corresponding interventions by the other G-7 countries to weaken the yen. A 
                                                 
36 IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2013; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
37 Michael Bordo, Owen F. Humpage, Anna J. Schwartz, “Foreign-Exchange Intervention and the Fundamental 
Trilemma of International Finance: Notes for Currency Wars,” VoxEU, June 18, 2012, 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/notes-currency-wars-trilemma-international-finance. 
38 Daniel Gros, “An Overlooked Currency War in Europe,” VoxEU, October 11, 2012, 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/overlooked-currency-war-europe. 
39 Ibid., “Positive-Sum Currency Wars,” Economist, February 14, 2013. 
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crisis in Japan (earthquake, tsunami, and threat of nuclear crisis) in March 2011 
had sparked a sharp appreciation of the yen, which some feared would throw the 
world’s third-largest economy back into recession, prompting the coordinated 
interventions;40  
• South Korea, which is believed to have intervened in currency markets 
intermittently to hold down the value of the won in the latter part of 2012 and 
early 2013;41 and  
• New Zealand, whose central bank revealed in May 2013 that it had intervened in 
currency markets to stem appreciation of its currency, the New Zealand dollar 
(nicknamed the kiwi).42  
More generally, according to a December 2012 study by the Peterson Institute of International 
Economics (PIIE), more than 20 countries have cumulatively increased their foreign exchange 
reserves by nearly $1 trillion annually for several years, mainly through interventions in foreign 
currency markets, and as a result have been able to keep their currencies “substantially 
undervalued.”43 The study identifies China, Denmark, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Switzerland, and Taiwan as most heavily engaged in currency interventions.  
Debates 
A number of countries are actively intervening, or have recently intervened, in foreign exchange 
markets to lower the value of their currencies, and there are different views among economists 
about the consequences of these interventions for other countries. Some economists argue that 
currency interventions have helped countries give their exports a boost at the expense of other 
countries. The December 2012 study by the PIIE estimates that currency interventions have 
caused the U.S. trade deficit to increase by $200 billion to $500 billion per year and the U.S. 
economy to lose between 1 million and 5 million jobs.44 The study also argues that currency 
interventions have adversely affected the economies of Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Eurozone, 
India, and Mexico, in addition to a number of other developing economies.  
Other economists are skeptical that one country’s interventions in foreign exchange markets have 
had adverse consequences for other countries. For example, some economists argue that 
interventions in foreign exchange markets by other countries change the composition of output in 
                                                 
40 Peter Garnham and David Oakley, “G7 Nations Co-ordinate $25bn Yen Sell-Off,” Financial Times, March 18, 2011. 
41 According to the April 2013 Treasury report on exchange rates, the Korean government does not publish intervention 
data, but many market participants believe that the Korean authorities intervened in currency markets in the latter part 
of 2012 and early 2013. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, “Report to Congress on 
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” April 12, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20April%202013.pdf. 
42 Alan Beattie, “Hostilities Escalate to Hidden Currency War,” Financial Times, September 27, 2010; U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, “Report to Congress on International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies,” April 12, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20April%202013.pdf; Rebecca Howard, “NZ Central Bank 
Admits Currency Intervention to Dampen Dollar,” Dow Jones, May 9, 2013. 
43 C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon, “Currency Manipulation, the US Economy, and the Global Economic 
Order,” Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief 12-25, December 2012, 
http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2302. 
44 Ibid. 
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the United States (particularly the size of the export and domestic-oriented sectors), but do not 
reduce the overall employment or output levels in the U.S. economy. Some economists also 
question whether currency interventions have long-lasting effects on exchange rate levels, 
particularly for countries with floating currencies. They argue that the large size of international 
capital flows overwhelms, in the long term, government purchases and sales of foreign 
currencies, and that other economic fundamentals, such as interest rates, inflation rates, and 
overall economic performance, have much greater effects on exchange rate levels. 
Still other economists argue that it is hard to make generalizations about the effects of currency 
interventions, and that, depending on the specific circumstances, currency interventions may or 
may not be “fair” policies.45 For example, they argue that relevant factors can include: 
• Does the government intervene in currency markets to sometimes strengthen 
and sometimes weaken its currency, or does it always intervene to weaken its 
currency? “Two-way” interventions (sometimes strengthening the currency, 
sometimes weakening the currency) may be evidence that the country is using 
currency interventions to sustain a pegged exchange rate that is close to its long-
term fundamental or equilibrium value. Some economists argue that “one-way” 
interventions (always selling domestic currency) may be evidence that the 
government is using interventions to sustain a currency that is below the 
currency’s fundamental or equilibrium value. 
• Does the government intervene periodically, or on a continual basis? Periodic 
interventions may smooth potentially disruptive short-term fluctuations in the 
exchange rate and help the country build foreign exchange reserves, which can 
help it guard against economic crises. Sustained, or long-term, interventions may 
create negative distortions in the global economy.  
• Does the government allow the intervention to increase its domestic money 
supply, or does the government “sterilize” the intervention to prevent an 
increase in its domestic money supply? When some governments intervene in 
currency markets by selling domestic currency, they allow the domestic money 
supply to increase. This is called an unsterilized intervention. When other 
countries (such as China and, sometimes, Switzerland) intervene, they do not 
allow their money supply to increase. Instead, when they sell domestic currency 
in exchange for foreign currency, they then sell a corresponding quantity of 
domestic government bonds to remove the extra domestic currency from 
circulation. This is called a sterilized intervention. It may matter to other 
countries whether the intervening country sterilizes the intervention or not. For 
example, increasing the money supply may help increase domestic demand, 
which in certain circumstances can cause consumers to buy more, not fewer, 
imports from other countries. Additionally, an increase in the money supply may 
cause prices to rise in the medium term. This may mean that the exchange rate 
adjusted for inflation (the real exchange rate) may not change in the medium 
term (after prices adjust), even if the nominal exchange rate (the exchange rate 
not adjusted for inflation) falls. 
                                                 
45 For example, see Matthew O’Brien, “Currency Wars, What Are They Good For? Absolutely Ending Depressions,” 
The Atlantic, February 5, 2013; “Trial of Strength,” Economist, September 23, 2010. 
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Expansionary Monetary Policies 
In addition to intervening directly in foreign exchange markets, governments can weaken the 
value of their currency through expansionary monetary policies. Monetary policy is the process 
by which a government (usually the central bank) controls the supply of money in an economy, 
such as by changing the interest rates through buying and selling government bonds. Changes in 
the money supply can impact the value of the currency. For example, increasing the supply of 
British pounds can cause the price of the pound to fall.  
Some emerging markets, particularly Brazil, have been critical of the expansionary monetary 
policies adopted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Eurozone in response to the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009. A number of countries have also raised concerns about 
Japan’s monetary policies, following a major policy shift in late 2012 and early 2013. 
Quantitative Easing in the United States, UK, and Eurozone46 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, the Eurozone adopted 
expansionary monetary policies to respond to the economic recession following the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. In addition to cutting interest rates, the Federal Reserve, the Bank 
of England, and the European Central Bank (ECB) used quantitative easing to provide further 
monetary stimulus. Quantitative easing is an unconventional form of monetary policy that 
expands the money supply through government purchases of assets, usually government bonds. 
Quantitative easing is typically used when more conventional monetary policy tools are no longer 
feasible, for example, when short-term interest rates cannot be cut because they are already near 
zero.  
Some emerging markets have argued that because the U.S. dollar, the British pound, and the euro 
are floating currencies, expansionary policies in these countries have caused these currencies to 
depreciate against the currencies of emerging markets. For example, Brazil has argued that 
quantitative easing in developed countries was a key factor in causing its currency (the real) to 
appreciate by more than 25% against the dollar between the start of 2009 and the end of the third 
quarter of 2010 (see Figure 4), when Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, declared that a 
currency “war” had broken out in the global economy.47 Brazil imposed some short-term controls 
on inflows of capital into Brazil (capital controls) to stem appreciation of the real.48  
In response to the concerns of emerging markets, many policy makers and analysts have argued 
that the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the ECB adopted expansionary monetary 
policies for domestic purposes (combatting the recession), and that any effect on their currencies 
was a side-effect or by-product of the policy.49 For example, during a Senate Banking Committee 
hearing in February 2013, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, stressed that the 
Federal Reserve is not engaged in a currency war or targeting the value of the U.S. dollar.50 
                                                 
46 For more on quantitative easing in the United States, see CRS Report R42962, Federal Reserve: Unconventional 
Monetary Policy Options, by Marc Labonte. 
47 For example, see “Brazil Warns of World Currency War,” Reuters, September 28, 2010. In this report, exchange rate 
data is from the Federal Reserve unless otherwise noted. 
48 Samantha Pearson, “Brazil Launches Fresh ‘Currency War’ Offensive,” Financial Times, March 15, 2012. 
49 For example, see “Phoney Currency Wars,” Economist, February 16, 2013. 
50 U.S. Congress, Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing on the Semi-Annual Monetary Policy Report, 
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Instead, he emphasized that monetary policy is being used to achieve domestic economic 
objectives (high employment and price stability). He also stressed that monetary policies to 
strengthen aggregate demand in the United States are not “zero-sum,” because they raise the 
demand for the exports of other countries. 
The concerns of emerging markets about the effects of quantitative easing have eased in recent 
months. As developed countries have started discussing rolling back expansionary monetary 
policies, the real has weakened substantially against the U.S. dollar (see Figure 4). Brazil’s 
government, in fact, has started expressing concerns about the real becoming too weak, and in 
August 2013, intervened in foreign currency markets to strengthen its currency.51 The concerns of 
emerging-market economies about the potential rollback of quantitative easing policies in 
developed countries, including the United States, were a major topic of discussion at the 
September 2013 G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia.52 
Figure 4. U.S. Dollar-Brazilian Real Exchange Rate 
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
Note: An increase represents an appreciation of the Brazilian real relative to the U.S. dollar. 
Japan and “Abenomics” 
Concerns have also been recently raised about major changes in Japan’s monetary policy and 
their effects on the value of the yen. Elected in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has 
made it a priority of his administration to grow Japan’s economy and eliminate deflation (falling 
prices), which has plagued Japan for many years. His economic plan, nicknamed “Abenomics,” 
relies on three major economic policies: expansionary monetary policies, fiscal stimulus, and 
structural reforms. To promote expansionary monetary policy, Japan’s central bank (the Bank of 
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113th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 2013. 
51 For example, see Matthew Malinowski and Blake Schmidt, “Brazil Real Surges on $60 Billion Intervention Plan,” 
Bloomberg, August 23, 2013. 
52 G-20 Leaders’ Declaration, September 2013, St. Petersburg, http://www.g20.org/documents. 
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Japan) unveiled a host of new measures in the first half of 2013, including goals to double the 
monetary base (commercial bank reserves plus currency circulating in the public) and to double 
its holdings of Japanese government bonds. By buying government bonds in exchange for yen, 
the Bank of Japan can increase Japan’s money supply.  
Changes in Japan’s monetary policies, along with fiscal stimulus measures, appear to be 
contributing to a strengthening of Japan’s economy. For example, in July 2013, the IMF upgraded 
its forecast of growth in Japan for 2013, from 1.5% to 2.0%.53 However, the expansionary 
monetary policies may have also contributed to a relatively sharp depreciation of the yen, which 
fell more than 25% between mid-2012 and mid-2013 (see Figure 5), even as Japan has not 
directly intervened in currency markets since 2011. 
Several countries have expressed their concerns about a weakening of the yen. An official from 
the Russian central bank reportedly warned that “Japan is weakening the yen and other countries 
may follow,” and that “the world is on the brink of a fresh currency war.”54 Additionally, the 
president of China’s sovereign wealth fund reportedly warned Japan against using its neighbors as 
a “garbage bin” by deliberately devaluing the yen, and South Korea’s finance minister argued that 
Japan’s weakening yen hurts his country’s economy more than threats from North Korea.55 
Movements in Japan’s currency have also created concerns for some Members of Congress, with 
concerns being raised about the currency policies in the context of the TPP, where Japan is one of 
the negotiating parties.  
Others argue that a weakening yen in recent months has partially offset the slow, but continued, 
appreciation of the yen in the preceding several years (Figure 5). For example, in January 2012, 
the IMF estimated that the Japanese yen was “moderately overvalued from a medium-term 
perspective.”56 Some also argue that, rather than targeting the value of the currency, Japan’s 
monetary policies are targeting domestic objectives, namely, beating deflation that has plagued 
the economy for many years. Japan’s finance minister, Taro Aso, reportedly stated that “monetary 
easing is aimed at pulling Japan out of deflation quickly. It is not accurate at all to criticize (us) 
for manipulating currencies.”57 
 
                                                 
53 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, July 9, 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/update/02/. 
54 Simon Kennedy and Scott Rose, “Russia Says World is Nearing Currency War as Europe Joins,” Bloomberg, 
January 16, 2013. 
55 Lingling Wei, “China Fund Warns Japan Against a ‘Currency War,’” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2013; Cynthia 
Kim, “South Korea’s Hyun Says Yen Bigger Issue than North Korea,” Bloomberg, April 18, 2013. 
56 IMF, “Japan: Solid Recovery, but Europe Dampens Outlook,” IMF Survey Online, June 12, 2012, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/car061112b.htm.  
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Figure 5. U.S. Dollar-Japanese Yen Exchange Rate 
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
Note: A decrease represents a depreciation of the yen relative to the U.S. dollar. 
Debates 
There is debate over whether the expansionary monetary policies, including quantitative easing, 
implemented by some developed economies have been “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies. Some 
argue that expansionary monetary policies have unfairly caused the currencies of developed 
countries to depreciate against other countries, giving the exports of developed countries an 
“unfair” export boost. However, most economists agree that the expansionary policies in the 
United States, the UK, the Eurozone, and Japan have been designed to stimulate their domestic 
economies and will, in the medium term, cause prices to rise. As a result, they argue that there 
will be little effect on the real exchange rate (the exchange rate adjusted for differences in prices 
across countries) in the medium term (as prices increase), even if the nominal exchange rate (the 
exchange rate not adjusted for differences in prices across countries) falls in the short term. 
However, it should be noted that inflation in all these countries remains very low, to date. 
Additionally, some argue that the expansionary policies stimulate domestic consumption and 
investment, which ordinarily leads to higher, not lower, imports from other countries, all else 
being equal.58 They argue that the net effect of quantitative easing and similar policies on trading 
partners is not necessarily negative and could be positive in some instances. For example, the 
IMF estimated that the first round of quantitative easing in the United States resulted in 
substantial output gains for the rest of the world, and that the second round generated modest 
output gains for the rest of the world.59 
For some economists, then, a key question to evaluate whether expansionary monetary policies 
are “fair” or “unfair” in the context of claims about “currency wars” is: 
                                                 
58 “Positive-Sum Currency Wars,” Economist, February 14, 2013. 
59 IMF, “The United States Spillover Report – 2011 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report No. 11/203, July 
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• Is it appropriate for countries to adopt expansionary monetary policies to 
combat a domestic economic recession, even if some sectors in other 
countries may be adversely affected in the short run?: Some economists argue 
that it is entirely “natural” for countries to unilaterally adopt the monetary 
policies to suit their specific needs of the domestic economy, and that countries 
should use expansionary monetary policies to respond to economic recessions.60 
Moreover, most central banks, including the Fed, are pursuing statutory mandates 
that do not include foreign exchange rate requirements and responsibilities. Other 
economists argue that countries have a number of policy tools to respond to 
economic recessions, not just monetary policy, and that in today’s globalized 
economy, a country should consider the potential negative spillover effects on 
other countries in its decision-making process. 
Addressing Disagreements over Exchange Rates 
Government policies that impact exchange rates have been a source of contention among 
countries. Various avenues have been developed or explored over the years to address specific 
currency disputes, both at the multilateral level and through U.S. law, with varying degrees of 
impact.  
On the multilateral front, countries have made commitments to refrain from “manipulating” their 
exchange rates to gain an unfair trade advantage through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Additionally, some argue that commitments made in the context of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) are relevant to disagreements over exchange rates, although this view is disputed. 
Exchange rate issues have also been addressed in the past through less formal channels of 
international economic coordination among small groups of developed economies.  
In addition to these multilateral forums, the United States has also adopted legislation to address 
unfair exchange rate policies pursued by other countries. In 1988, Congress enacted legislation to 
address “currency manipulation” by other countries. Congress has also included provisions on 
exchange rates in previous TPA legislation. 
Exchange rate issues have been a key source of discussion at recent G-7 and G-20 meetings, but 
little formal or concrete action has occurred beyond these discussions.61 Neither the IMF nor the 
U.S. Treasury Department has found any country to be manipulating its exchange rate in recent 
years. 
                                                 
60 For example, see Jeffrey Frankel, “Dispatches from the Currency Wars,” Project Syndicate, June 11, 2013. 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/blog/dispatches-from-the-currency-wars. 
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Forums to Potentially Address Disagreements 
International Monetary Fund 
With a nearly universal membership of 188 countries, the IMF is focused on promoting 
international monetary stability.62 The IMF has engaged on the exchange rate policies of its 
member countries as part of its mandate, arguably motivated by the experience of competitive 
devaluations in the 1930s.63 Its role on exchange rates has evolved over time.64 Currently, IMF 
member countries have agreed to several obligations on exchange rates in the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement, the document that lays out the rules governing the IMF and establishes a “code of 
conduct” for IMF member countries.65 The Articles state that countries can use whatever 
exchange rate system they wish—fixed or floating—so long as they follow certain guidelines; 
that countries should seek, in their foreign exchange and monetary policies, to promote orderly 
economic growth and financial stability; and that the IMF should engage in “firm” surveillance 
over the exchange rate policies of its members.66 
The Articles also state that IMF member countries are to “avoid manipulating exchange rates or 
the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or 
to gain an unfair advantage over other members.”67 An IMF Decision, issued in 1977 and updated 
in 2007 and 2012, provides further guidance that, among other things, “a member will only be 
considered to be manipulating exchange rates in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage 
over other members if the Fund determines both that: (a) the member is engaged in these policies 
for the purposes of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an 
undervalued exchange rate; and (b) the purpose of securing such misalignment is to increase net 
exports.”68  
                                                 
62 For more on the IMF, CRS Report R42019, International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress, by 
Martin A. Weiss. 
63 For example, see Morris Goldstein, “Currency Manipulation and Enforcing the Rules of the International Monetary 
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international transactions, particularly relating to the capital account (financial transactions) and its current account 
(export and import of goods and services, plus income and other unilateral transfers, such as gifts or remittances). 
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Information Notice (PIN) No. 07/69, June 21, 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm; IMF, 
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If a member country were to be found to be in violation of its obligations to the IMF, under the 
rules laid out in the Articles, it could be punished through restrictions on its access to IMF 
funding, suspension of its voting rights at the IMF, or, ultimately, expulsion from the IMF.69 
To date, the IMF has never publicly labeled a member country a currency manipulator.70 Some 
argue that the IMF’s definition of currency “manipulation” has made it tough to go after currency 
“manipulators.” They argue that it requires the IMF to determine or demonstrate that policies 
shaping the exchange rate level have been for the express purpose of increasing net exports, and 
that “intent” is hard to establish.71 Even if the IMF could demonstrate a country is manipulating 
its exchange rate under its definition of the term, some analysts also argue that, in practice, the 
IMF does not have a credible mechanism for dealing with “manipulators,” particularly countries 
that are not reliant on IMF financing.72 They argue that it is extremely unlikely the IMF would 
actually strip violators of their IMF voting rights or expel them from the institution. 
World Trade Organization 
With 159 member countries, the WTO is the principal international organization governing world 
trade. It was established in 1995 as a successor institution to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), a post-World War II institution intended to liberalize and promote 
nondiscrimination in trade among countries. Unique among the major international trade and 
finance organizations, the WTO has a mechanism for enforcing its rules through a dispute 
settlement process. 
Given the relationship between exchange rates and trade, some have argued that the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has a role to play in responding to currency disputes. Some analysts and 
lawyers have examined whether WTO provisions allow for recourse against countries that are 
unfairly undervaluing its currency.73 
One aspect of the debate is whether WTO agreement on export subsidies applies to countries with 
undervalued currencies. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
specifies that countries may not provide subsidies to help promote their national exports, and 
countries are entitled to levy countervailing duties on imported products that receive subsidies 
from their national government.74 Some economists maintain that an undervalued currency lowers 
a firm’s cost of production relative to world prices and therefore helps encourage exports. Some 
argue, then, that an undervalued currency should count as an export subsidy. It is not clear, 
however, whether intentional undervaluation of a country's currency is an export subsidy under 
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72 Ibid. 
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the WTO's specific definition of the term, and thus is eligible for recourse through countervailing 
duties under WTO agreements. For example, the subsidy must be, among other things, specific to 
an industry and not provided generally to all producers. There is debate over whether intentional 
undervaluation of a currency is “industry specific” because it applies to everyone. 
Another aspect of the debate relates to a provision in the GATT (the WTO agreement on 
international trade in goods), which states that member countries “shall not, by exchange action, 
frustrate intent of the provisions” of the agreement.75 Some analysts argue that policies to 
undervalue a currency are protectionist policies, and thus should count as an exchange rate action 
that frustrates the intent of the GATT. Others argue that the language is too vague to apply to 
undervalued currencies.76 Specifically, they argue that the language was written to apply to an 
international system of exchange rates that no longer exists (the system of fixed exchange rates, 
combined with capital controls, that prevailed from the end of World War II to the early 1970s). 
No dispute over exchange rates has been brought before the WTO,77 and whether currency 
disputes fall under the WTO's jurisdiction remains a contested issue.78 
Less Formal Multilateral Coordination: The G-7 and the G-20 
In addition to formal international institutions focused on economic issues, like the IMF and the 
WTO, countries also use less formal forums to coordinate economic policies. Before the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, the primary forum was a small group of seven advanced economies, 
the G-7.79 Following the crisis, the G-20, a larger group of advanced and emerging-market 
countries, became the premier forum for international economic coordination.80 
In the past, small groups of advanced economies had had more success in addressing currency 
issues through this type of less formal international cooperation. For example, in 1985, France, 
West Germany, Japan, the United States, and the UK signed the Plaza Accord, in which countries 
agreed to intervene in currency markets to depreciate the U.S. dollar in relation to the Japanese 
yen and the German deutsche mark to address the U.S. trade deficit. In 1987, six countries (the 
five signatories of the Plaza Accord, plus Canada) signed the Louvre Accord, in which they 
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agreed to halt the depreciation of the U.S. dollar through a host of different policy measures, 
including taxes, public spending, and interest rates. Some economists argue that the Plaza and 
Louvre Accords were successful because they reinforced economic fundamentals that were 
pushing exchange rates in the desired direction. 
Additionally, small groups of countries have executed coordinated interventions in foreign 
exchange markets to shape the relative value of currencies. For example, the G-7 countries have 
coordinated interventions a number of times: in 1995, to halt the dollar’s fall against the yen; in 
2000, to support the value of the euro after its introduction; and in 2011, to stem appreciation of 
the yen following a major crisis in Japan.81 This coordination has occurred on an ad hoc, 
voluntary basis. It is not based on any specific set of rules or commitments on exchange rates, and 
has been limited to a small group of advanced economies. 
U.S. Law: The 1988 Trade Act 
In 1988, Congress enacted the “Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination 
Act of 1988” as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the 1988 Trade 
Act),82 when many policy makers were concerned about the appreciation of the U.S. dollar and 
large U.S. trade deficits.83 A key component of this act requires the Treasury Department to 
analyze on an annual basis the exchange rate policies of foreign countries, in consultation with 
the IMF, and “consider whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency 
and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments 
or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.” If “manipulation” is occurring 
with respect to countries that have (1) global currency account surpluses and (2) significant 
bilateral trade surpluses with the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury is to initiate 
negotiations, through the IMF or bilaterally, to ensure adjustment in the exchange rate and 
eliminate the “unfair” trade advantage. The Secretary of the Treasury is not required to start 
negotiations in cases where they would have a serious detrimental impact on vital U.S. economic 
and security interests. 
Additionally, the act requires the Treasury Secretary to submit a report annually to the Senate and 
House Banking Committees, on or before October 15, with written six-month updates (on April 
15), and the Secretary is expected to testify on the reports as requested.84 The reports are to 
address a host of issues related to exchange rate policies, such as currency market developments; 
currency interventions undertaken to adjust the exchange rate of the dollar; the impact of the 
exchange rate on U.S. competitiveness; and the outcomes of Treasury negotiations on currency 
issues, among others. 
Since the 1988 Trade Act was enacted, the Treasury Department has identified three countries as 
manipulating their currencies under the Trade Act’s terms: China, Taiwan, and South Korea.85 
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These designations occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s; Treasury has not found currency 
manipulation under the terms of the 1988 Trade Act since it last cited China in 1994. Some 
Members of Congress have been concerned by what they perceive as inaction by the Treasury 
Department on currency manipulation. In 2004, Congress passed legislation asking the Treasury 
Secretary to submit a report “describing how statutory provisions addressing currency 
manipulation by America’s trading partners ... can be better clarified administratively to provide 
for improved and more predictable evaluation, and to enable the problem of currency 
manipulation to be better understood by the American people.”86 In 2005, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) completed a study on Treasury’s assessments of whether countries 
manipulate their currencies for trade advantage.87 One conclusion in the report was that “Treasury 
has generally complied with the reporting requirements for its exchange rate reports, although its 
discussion of U.S. economic impacts has become less specific over time.” 
Trade Promotion Authority and Trade Agreements 
Given the potential links between exchange rate policies of other countries and the 
competitiveness of U.S. industry and exports, Congress has referenced addressing currency issues 
in previous TPA authorizations. For example, in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, which granted “fast track” authority (the precursor to TPA) to the President, the President 
was required, among other things, to submit a report to Congress with supporting information 
after entering a trade agreement. One part of this report was “describing the efforts made by the 
President to obtain international exchange rate equilibrium.”88  
Additionally, when TPA was last renewed in 2002, Congress included exchange rate issues as a 
priority that the Administration should promote. The legislation stipulated that the Administration 
should “seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to examine 
the trade consequences of significant and unanticipated currency movements and to scrutinize 
whether a foreign government engaged in a pattern of manipulating its currency to promote a 
competitive advantage in international trade.”89  
A number of free trade agreements (FTAs) were negotiated under the 2002 version of TPA, with 
Congress approving implementing legislation for FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, 
Morocco, the Dominican Republic and the Central American countries (CAFTA-DR), Bahrain, 
Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. It is not clear to what extent currency issues 
were salient issues in the negotiations or in the final agreements. 
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Responses to Current Disagreements 
To the extent that there has been a formal multilateral response to current disagreements over 
exchange rates, it has been through discussions at G-7 and G-20 meetings. During meetings in 
February 2013, for example, the G-7 nations reaffirmed their “long-standing commitment to 
market-determined exchange rates” and to “not target exchange rates.”90 The G-20 countries 
pledged to “refrain from competitive devaluation” in February 2013,91 and more recently in 
September 2013, that central banks “have committed that future changes to monetary policy 
settings will continue to be carefully calibrated and clearly communicated.”92 G-7 and G-20 
commitments are non-binding, although other enforcement mechanisms, including peer pressure, 
have been used to ensure compliance in the past. 
Current disagreements over exchange rates have not resulted in the IMF or the Treasury 
Department labeling any countries as currency manipulators, and no country has filed a dispute 
over exchange rate policies at the WTO. Starting in 2011, Brazil did present three papers on 
exchange rates and the role of the WTO for discussion at the WTO Working Group on Trade, 
Debt, and Finance. Reportedly, many other WTO members have approached the discussions with 
“reserve and skepticism” and believed that the IMF would be the appropriate forum for such a 
discussion.93  
Some analysts and policy makers have been concerned that current disagreements have not 
resulted in more formal action, particularly by the IMF and the Treasury Department, which have 
the clearest rules pertaining to currency manipulation. They argue that currency manipulation has 
occurred, but the current frameworks are ineffective at dealing with it. For example, they argue 
that it is hard to demonstrate that exchange rate policies have been for the express purpose of 
increasing net exports; the IMF does not have a clear enforcement mechanism for its rules on 
exchange rates; and the Treasury Department fears retaliation from countries it unilaterally labels 
as “manipulators.” One policy expert has stated that the greatest flaw in the international financial 
architecture is its failure to effectively counter and deter competitive currency policies.94 
Other analysts and policy makers contend that the current frameworks on “currency 
manipulation” are effective. They argue that formal action by the IMF and the Treasury 
Department has not occurred because countries have not engaged in policies that violate 
international commitments on exchange rates or triggered U.S. laws pertaining to currency 
manipulation. Some analysts also believe that the Treasury Department has at various times urged 
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countries to address exchange rate issues behind-the-scenes, even if it has not publicly labeled 
any countries as currency manipulators in recent years.95 
Policy Options for Congress 
Some Members of Congress have proposed taking action on currency issues, because they are 
concerned about the impact of other countries’ exchange rate policies on the competitiveness of 
U.S. exports and import-competing firms. Some Members could also be concerned that other 
countries have accused the United States of engaging in “currency wars.” If Members did decide 
to take action on exchange rates, there are a number of options for doing so, some of which 
Members are already pursuing. Policy options could include, among others: 
(1) Maintaining the status quo: Even though Members may be concerned about supporting U.S. 
exports and jobs from “unfair” exchange rate policies adopted by other countries, there may be a 
number of reasons to refrain from taking action on exchange rate disputes:  
• There is much debate among economists on how to calculate a currency’s 
“equilibrium” or “fundamental” long-term value, making the classification of 
currencies as undervalued or overvalued complex and subject to much 
discussion, with different models at times yielding very different results. Some 
economists also believe that currency interventions have limited, short-term 
effects, particularly on floating currencies, given the high volumes of capital 
flows. 
• U.S. imports from trading partners with weak currencies are less expensive than 
they would be otherwise. Lower-cost imports may benefit U.S. businesses that 
purchase inputs from abroad and U.S. consumers.  
• Unilaterally labeling a country as a currency manipulator or leading a multilateral 
charge against currency manipulation could trigger retaliation by other countries. 
For example, the United States has a low savings rate and benefits from low 
interest rates. Countries labeled as currency “manipulators” could buy fewer U.S. 
government bonds, making it more expensive and potentially harder for the U.S. 
government to finance its budget deficit.  
• Tensions over exchange rates could dissipate as the global economy strengthens, 
particularly if developed economies end quantitative easing. For example, 
Brazil’s concerns about the real appreciating against the U.S. dollar have 
reversed in recent months (and now Brazil is concerned about the real 
depreciating against the U.S. dollar too much). 
(2) Urging the Administration to address currency disputes at the IMF or WTO: Addressing 
currency disputes in formal international institutions may provide broad, multilateral support for 
decisions that are reached. The IMF and the WTO have been the international institutions 
identified as best suited for dealing with exchange rate disputes, because the IMF has the clearest 
set of commitments relating to currency manipulation, and the WTO is unique among 
international financial institutions in that it has a clear enforcement mechanism. However, 
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addressing disputes over exchange rates at the IMF and WTO may run into obstacles. For 
example, the IMF Executive Board may find it too politically sensitive to label a country as a 
“currency manipulator.” Congress could ask the Administration to push for changes to IMF 
and/or WTO rules to allow currency disputes to be addressed more clearly under these 
organizations, but this could be a complicated process that requires multilateral consensus. 
(3) Urging the Administration to strengthen informal international cooperation on exchange 
rates: For example, Congress could urge the Treasury Department to continue its push for G-20 
commitments on (1) greater transparency of foreign reserve data and currency intervention 
operations; and (2) avoidance of official public statements intended to influence exchange rate 
levels.96 Additionally, Congress could also urge the Administration to push for informal 
agreements to re-align the value of currencies, similar to the Plaza Accord and the Louvre Accord 
in the 1980s. However, some question whether informal cooperation can effectively foster 
cooperation on exchange rates consistently, not just on an as-needed or ad-hoc basis. The G-7 
excludes large emerging market economies that are major players in the global economy, but, at 
the same time, the G-20 may be too large and heterogeneous to reach meaningful agreements. 
Also, since agreements reached at the G-7 and G-20 are non-binding, questions have been raised 
about the effectiveness of these forums. This approach would also be unlikely to address 
manipulation by countries outside the G-7 or G-20, although some argue that G-20 action in 
particular would involve the major economies in the international economy. 
(4) Addressing currency issues in trade agreements or as a negotiating objective in TPA: 
Congress could address concerns about the exchange rate policies of other countries by urging the 
Administration to address currency issues in the free trade agreements currently under 
negotiation, including the TPP and TTIP. For example, Representative Levin released a proposal 
to address currency manipulation in the TPP in July 2013.97 With regards to any legislation 
renewing TPA, Congress could also identify currency issues as a trade policy priority, similar to 
the provisions included in the 2002 TPA legislation, or include currency issues as a more formal 
trade negotiating objective.  
Seeking to include currency issues in a trade agreement could make the agreement more difficult 
to conclude. There are also different views about how currency issues could or should be 
addressed. Some have called for enforceable provisions, but there may be disagreement over how 
exchange rate disputes would be adjudicated. Others have called for cooperative frameworks to 
examine currency issues. Additionally, any negotiated agreement on currency disagreements 
would be limited in scope, because it would apply to negotiating parties to the agreement and not 
to countries in the global economy more broadly.  
(5) Passing new legislation on undervalued exchange rates or amending existing legislation 
on currency manipulation: Some argue that legislation could directly address the concerns of 
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certain U.S. exporters and import-sensitive producers about “unfair” exchange rate policies of 
other countries, and could provide U.S. exporters with recourse and/or encourage other countries 
to push up the value of their currencies. Additionally, a possible advantage of legislation relating 
to countries with “undervalued” or “misaligned” currencies is that it could apply to all countries, 
not just a subset of countries, such as countries that are party to a trade negotiation with the 
United States. 
Several pieces of legislation on exchange rates have been introduced in previous Congresses, and 
two bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress: 
• The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (H.R. 1276) would affect the 
treatment of imports from countries with fundamentally undervalued exchange 
rates. If passed, it would broaden the definition of a “countervailable” subsidy (or 
a subsidy that could be eligible to be offset through higher import duties) to 
include the benefit conferred on merchandise imports into the United States from 
foreign countries with fundamentally undervalued currencies.98  
• The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2013 (S. 1114) 
proposes methods for addressing exchange rate issues. Among other provisions, 
the legislation prescribes negotiations and consultations with countries with 
fundamentally misaligned exchange rates, and actions to take against “priority 
action” countries that have failed, or persistently failed, to take action to 
eliminate exchange rate misalignments.99 
Others argue that it could be difficult to reach consensus on if, and if so, by how much, a currency 
is undervalued or misaligned. Additionally, if currency “manipulation” was defined in statute, it 
could be inflexible. As mentioned earlier, unilateral legislation could also provoke countries that 
are labeled as having undervalued currencies, and cause them to retaliate in ways that undermine 
other U.S. interests. Legislation could also harm U.S. producers and consumers that buy and use 
imported goods. Finally, some have raised questions about whether legislation relating to import 
duties would violate WTO rules. 
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Conclusion 
Exchange rates are important prices in the global economy, and changes in exchange rates have 
potentially substantial implications for international trade and investment flows across countries. 
Following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, tensions among countries over exchange rate 
policies have arguably broadened. Some policy makers and analysts have expressed concerns that 
some governments are pursuing exchange rate policies to gain a trade advantage, as many 
countries grapple with economic recession or slow growth and high unemployment following the 
financial crisis. Concerns have focused on both government interventions in currency markets in 
a number of other countries, including China and Switzerland, and expansionary monetary 
policies in some developed economies. On the other hand, some economists argue that the effects 
of exchange rate policies are nuanced, creating winners and losers, and that it is hard to make 
generalized claims about the negative effects of “currency wars.”  
Members concerned about the competitiveness of the United States may want to weigh the pros 
and cons of taking action on exchange rate disputes. If policy makers do want to take action, a 
number of policy options are available. Some Members of Congress have proposed legislation to 
address currency undervaluation by other countries and proposed addressing currency issues in 
on-going trade negotiations, particularly in the context of the proposed TPP and any renewal of 
TPA. Members could also urge the Administration to press the issue more forcefully at 
international institutions, such as the IMF or WTO, or more informal forums for international 
cooperation, including the G-7 or the G-20. 
To date, the most formal response to current tensions over exchange rates has been through 
discussions at G-7 and G-20 meetings. Although frameworks have been set up for addressing 
currency “manipulation” at the IMF and through U.S. law, neither the IMF nor the U.S. Treasury 
Department has taken formal action on current disputes over exchange rates. There are debates 
about why formal action has not been taken at these institutions. One general complicating factor 
in addressing currency disputes is that estimating a currency’s “fundamental” or “true” value is 
extremely complex and subject to debate among economists.  
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